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What an Apophaticist Can Know: Divine Ineffability and the Beatific 
Vision 
 
David Efird and David Worsley 
 
The doctrines of divine ineffability and of the beatific vision seem to contradict 
each other. According to the former, we cannot know the divine essence. But, 
according to the latter, we will know God fully. To reconcile these doctrines, we 
first distinguish between propositional and personal knowledge, that is, between 
knowing about a person and knowing a person, and, following from this 
distinction, we then distinguish between propositional and personal ineffability, 
that is, between it being impossible to know about a person and it being impossible 
to know a person. We then argue God is propositionally ineffable but personally 
effable. 
 
According to the doctrine of divine ineffability, God is beyond description and comprehension. The 
belief in this doctrine is one of the hallmarks of apophatic theology, a system of negative theology 
common to virtually every major Church theologian during the early times of the Church.
1
 One of the 
most influential of these apophatic theologians was the fifth century Pseudo-Dionysius (Denys). In 
referring to God (Ôthe Transcendent OneÕ), Denys writes in his The Mystical Theology: 
It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding.... 
It cannot be spoken of and it cannot be grasped by understanding.... It has no power, it is not 
power, nor is it light. It does not live nor is it life. It is not a substance, nor is it eternity or 
time.... It is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness.... It is not sonship or fatherhood 
and it is nothing known to us or to any other being. It falls neither within the predicate of 
																																								 																				
1
 For a fuller defence of this claim, see John Hick, 2000: 36. 
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nonbeing nor of being.... There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it.... It is 
beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of 
it... for it is ... free of every limitation, beyond every limitation: it is also beyond denial.
2
 
On the same theme, another major figure in early church history was the fourth-century theologian, 
Gregory of Nyssa, who writes in his Against Eunomius, 
The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, namely, incapable of 
being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any other device of our apprehension, remaining 
beyond the reach not only of the human but of the angelic and all supramundane intelligence, 
unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression in words, having but one name that can 
represent His proper nature, the single name being 'Above Every Name'.
3
 
Furthermore, to borrow from the fifth century liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, God is  
ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and eternally the same, 
thou and thine Only-begotten Son and thy Holy Spirit. 
Moreover, Augustine wrote that ÔGod transcends the mindÕ
4
 whilst Aquinas noted that Ôby its 
immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus, we are unable 
to apprehend it by knowing what it isÕ.
5
 And this brief survey barely scratches the surface of support 
the position has received.
6
 
However, despite such protestations, according to the doctrine of the beatific vision, a 
doctrine also accepted by many (but not all) of these same apophatic theologians, we will one day 
know God as God knows us. In 1 Corinthians 13:12, the Apostle Paul explains that although in this 
life we see God as through frosted glass, there is a time coming when  
																																								 																				
2
 Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987: 141. 
3
 Gregory of Nyssa, 1957: 99. 
4
 St Augustine, 1953: 259. 
5
 Thomas Aquinas, 1955: 96. 
6
 See, for instance, Ayers (2004) on the place of divine incomprehension in Orthodox tradition. 
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we shall see God face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know God fully, even as I am 
fully known. 
This seeing God face to face, when we know God fully even as we are fully known, is traditionally 
termed Ôthe beatific visionÕ. Thinking of this vision, Aquinas writes concerning the knowledge we 
will then have of God: 
I answer that final and perfect beatitude can consist in nothing else than the vision of the 
divine essence. To make this clear, two things must be considered. First, man is not perfectly 
happy so long as something remains for him to desire and seek. Secondly, the perfection of 
any power is determined by the nature of its object. The object of the intellect is Ôwhat a thing 
is,Õ i.e. the essence of a thing, as is stated in De anima, book 3 (ch. 6). It follows that the 
intellect attains perfection, insofar as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect 
knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, 
i.e. to know of the cause Ôwhat it isÕ; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, 
although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the cause exists. 
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally 
remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, Ôwhat it is.Õ And this desire is one of 
wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (1.2). For 
instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, considers that it must be due to some 
cause, and yet not know what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering 
proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrives at knowledge of the essence 
of the cause. If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, 
knows no more of God than Ôthat He isÕ; the perfection of his intellect has not yet directly 
[simpliciter] attained the First Cause, and so the natural desire to seek the cause still remains 
for him. On account of which he is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect 
happiness the intellect needs to attain to the very essence of the First Cause. And thus it will 
4	
	
have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone manÕs 
happiness consists. (ST I-II, q. 3, a. 8)
7
 
And later, Aquinas quotes from Augustine who wrote: 
Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of 
God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing 
else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing 
something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says 
(Confess. v.): "Unhappy is he who knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), "and knoweth not 
Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both 
Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only." (ST Supplement, q. 92, a. 3) 
So, on the one hand, according to the apophaticist, we can know nothing of God, yet, on the other 
hand, according to the Apostle Paul, we will know God fully. Can both thoughts be held without 
contradiction or confusion? At first glance, it looks like if God is truly ineffable that would preclude 
us coming to have any knowledge of Him, let alone full knowledge. If God is beyond description and 
comprehension, if He is in some sense unknowable, how on earth (or in heaven) can we come to have 
full knowledge of Him? Conversely, if it turns out that we can know Him even as He knows us, in 
what sense can God be considered ineffable at all? 
Despite this prima facie tension, we argue in this paper that the apophatacist can reconcile 
these two doctrines, but only if the doctrine of divine ineffability is qualified in a certain way. A 
qualification that is based on a distinction Eleonore Stump makes between two kinds of knowledge, 
what she calls ÔFranciscan knowledgeÕ and what she calls ÔDominican knowledgeÕ. In the first section 
																																								 																				
7
 See also Aquinas in SCG III ch. 50: 
 
No desire leads so high as the desire to understand the truth. For all our other desires, whether of 
delight or anything else that is desired by man, can come to rest in other things. However, the afore-
mentioned desire does not come to rest until it reaches God, the supreme foundation and maker of all 
things. For this reason Wisdom aptly says: ÒI dwelt in high places, and my throne was in a pillar of 
cloudÓ (Sir 24:4). And in Prov 9:3 it is said that ÒShe has sent out her maids to call from the highest 
places in the town.Ó Let them therefore be ashamed who seek the beatitude of man, so highly situated, 
in base things. 
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of this essay, we will briefly introduce both kinds of knowledge and her account of the distinction 
between them. In the second section, we will explore the effect this distinction has on the nature of 
divine ineffability, namely, that ineffability could be used in reference to only one kind of knowledge 
or to both kinds. In the third section, we will offer reasons to favour a more limited conception of 
divine ineffability, and, in the fourth section, we will show how this limited conception of divine 
ineffability can be reconciled with the prima facie contradicting doctrine of the beatific vision. 
 
Franciscan and Dominican knowledge 
It is easy enough to say roughly what it is to be ineffable, namely, to be ineffable is to be beyond 
description, or beyond human concepts. However, saying precisely what it is to be ineffable is 
notoriously difficult, since even in saying that something is beyond human concepts we have 
described it and applied a human concept to it.
8
 Nevertheless, we will tentatively propose two 
different ways in which we can think about what it is to be ineffable by employing a distinction made 
by Stump between two kinds of knowledge, namely, Dominican knowledge and Franciscan 
knowledge (Stump, 2010: 40-63). 
According to Stump, Dominican knowledge is propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge-
that. Franciscan knowledge, on the other hand, is neither propositional knowledge nor is reducible to 
propositional knowledge. Such knowledge includes knowledge gained from phenomenal experience 
and from experience of persons, according to Stump.
9
 This much is easy to say. However, in virtue of 
																																								 																				
8
 Augustine famously made this point in On Christian Doctrine: 
 
God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is said. And a contradiction in 
terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is 
called ineffable. (Augustine, 1958: 10Ð11). 
9
 Stump explains this thought in the following way:  
 
I want to claim, however, that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a Franciscan knowledge, which 
is non-propositional and which is not reducible to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a 
skeptical objector may ask. But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an 
incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms of knowledge that what I 
am claiming could not be presented that way. (Stump, 2010: 52) 
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the irreducibility of Franciscan knowledge to Dominican knowledge, finding a way to illustrate the 
differences between each kind of knowledge is challenging, since, while Dominican knowledge can 
be expressed propositionally, for example, Donald Trump knows that Barack Obama was his 
predecessor, Franciscan knowledge canÕt be expressed propositionally Ð that is the very point of 
Franciscan knowledge. But we can present some thought experiments in which Franciscan knowledge 
is manifested Ð we can show the distinction, but we canÕt describe it, in other words. 
 To begin, phenomenal knowledge, according to Stump, is Franciscan knowledge. She 
illustrates this with Frank JacksonÕs (in)famous thought experiment about Mary, the super smart 
colour scientist: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a 
black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the 
neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to 
obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 
'blue', and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations from the 
sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the 
contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering 
of the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle possible to 
obtain all this physical information from black and white television, otherwise the Open 
University would of necessity need to use colour television.)  
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour 
television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn 
something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her 
																																								 																				
Stump distinguishes Ôknowledge-of-personsÕ from the Ôknowledge-howÕ ability hypothesis that Laurence 
Nemirow (1990), David Lewis (2004) and Paul Churchill (2004) discuss. The knowledge-how ability 
hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or 
recognize what it is like to have that experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The 
position that Stump takes up, then, is closer to Earl ConeeÕs ÔacquaintanceÕ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there 
is no new propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-
how, namely, acquaintance with the thing known. 
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previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is 
more to have than that, and Physicalism is false. (Jackson, 1982: 130) 
What is important for StumpÕs purposes is that MaryÕs epistemic position is improved on her 
departure from her black and white room, when she sees colour for the first time. Either she learns 
something new or she learns something old in a new way.
10
 And this improvement in her epistemic 
position is the Franciscan knowledge she gains by experiencing colour for the first time, this 
phenomenal knowledge she now has.  
Modifying JacksonÕs thought experiment, Stump asks us to imagine another Mary who has 
been locked in a room since birth. Mary has never had a second-personal encounter with her mother, 
and does not have access to any narrative account of her mother. Nevertheless, in MaryÕs room, Mary 
has access (through encyclopaedias) to all relevant non-narrative propositional information about the 
existence of her loving mother, along with all that science can teach about her. Stump writes: 
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary will know 
things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about her mother that could 
be made available to her in non- narrative propositional form, including her mother's 
psychological states. Although Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, 
when she is united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this 
will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a scientific 
description as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that she is 
loved by someone else. (Stump, 2010: 52) 
Just as the super smart colour scientist MaryÕs epistemic position is improved upon leaving her black 
and white room, so is the daughter MaryÕs epistemic position improved upon leaving her lonely room: 
either daughter Mary learns something new or she learns something old in a new way upon meeting 
her mother. With these thought experiments in hand, we now have a way of showing what Franciscan 
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 On Paul ChurchlandÕs view, Mary merely learns something old in a new way (Churchland, 1985). In other 
words, Churchland would want to say that Franciscan knowledge (the something new) is in some sense captured 
by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional knowledge (the something old).
10
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knowledge is, even if we canÕt describe it. Now, on our view, this kind of knowledge, and its 
distinction from Dominican knowledge, is crucial for understanding the doctrine of divine ineffability 
and how it can be held consistently with the doctrine of the beatific vision. To show this, we turn to 
explaining the nature of divine ineffability using this distinction. 
 
Divine ineffability 
In the previous section we introduced StumpÕs distinction between Dominican knowledge, that is, 
knowledge expressible by propositions, and Franciscan knowledge, that is, knowledge inexpressible 
by propositions. In this section, we will briefly examine how the distinction between these two kinds 
of knowledge might lead to two distinct conceptions of ineffability. 
If Franciscan knowledge is indeed by its very nature beyond description, and if, roughly 
speaking, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, all Franciscan knowledge must be in some sense 
ineffable. Let us call this sort of ineffability Ôpropositional ineffabilityÕ Ð the impossibility of 
capturing something through propositional description. Divine ineffability, where ÔineffabilityÕ is 
understood as Ôpropositional ineffabilityÕ, seems fairly straightforward. If knowledge of other persons 
can be propositionally ineffable, (in StumpÕs modified thought experiment, the knowledge Mary gains 
as she learns what it is like for her mother to love her would be propositionally ineffable), it is easy to 
see how God, too, could be, in some comparable sense, propositionally ineffable (simply replace 
MaryÕs mother with God in StumpÕs modified thought experiment).
11
  
Now, there is one important difference between knowledge of God and knowledge of persons. 
On StumpÕs thought experiment of daughter Mary, Franciscan knowledge could lie in her learning 
something old in a new way. But, for the apophaticist, that is simply not possible for our knowledge 
of God. It cannot be the case that what we learn of God at the beatific vision is something old in a 
new way, for if the doctrine of divine ineffability is correct, there is a sense in which we can know 
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 Given this, it is only a matter of degree that separates total propositional ineffability (supposed in God) from 
partial propositional ineffability (in you or me). One could, for instance, imagine a world where some (and 
perhaps all) propositionally effable knowledge of some person is subtracted. 
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nothing old (i.e., nothing fundamental that is reducible to propositional form) about God.
12
 And this 
usefulness, we think, gives us one reason to at least pay serious consideration to StumpÕs account.
13
 
But at this point a putative objector might respond: surely divine ineffability is all or nothing, 
at least with respect to propositions. It is not just that there are aspects of God that are propositionally 
ineffable. If the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, unlike MaryÕs mother, God is (at the very least) 
entirely propositionally ineffable. And yet surely we do want to attribute to God certain propositional 
claims. Does divine ineffability require that we jettison propositional beliefs such as ÔGod is goodÕ or 
ÔGod is three in hypostasis, one in ousiaÕ? Jonathan Jacobs tackled this objection in a recent paper, 
arguing that these beliefs need not in fact be jettisoned. Indeed, Jacobs argued, we can, without 
contradiction, believe that it is literally, mind-independently true that God is good, and at the same 
time believe that it is true that God is ineffable. A proposition, he argued, can be fundamentally true 
(actually carving reality at its joints), or non-fundamentally true (representing an artificial or 
gerrymandered structure of reality). For Jacobs, divine ineffability asserts that God is fundamentally 
ineffable, but leaves room for GodÕs non-fundamental effability (for instance, it is non-fundamentally 
true that God is fundamentally ineffable).
14
 He writes: 
We can, using non-fundamental propositions, describe God correctly. We can say 
lots of true things about how God is intrinsically. He is wise, loving. He is three in 
hypostasis, one in ousia. Such propositions need not be metaphorical. They can be 
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 In this case, it might be true in one sense that Mary knows all propositionally reducible knowledge of God 
whilst in confinement, it just so happens there is no (fundamental) propositional knowledge of God to be had. 
Of course, Stump has a story about how Franciscan knowledge can be transferred through testimony, and 
through narrative, so Stump requires the qualification that all information she has be in non-narrative 
propositional form. Were Mary to have access to narrative, for instance, biblical narrative, she might possess 
certain limited (or ÔdimÕ, as certain older translations of 1 Corinthians 13:12 read) Franciscan knowledge of 
God, but that this is possible serves only to reinforce the argument we are presenting. 
13
 For a further defence of StumpÕs position, see Wolterstorff, 2016. Note that Wolterstorff describes 
ÔFranciscanÕ knowledge as Ôobject-knowledgeÕ, and he too distinguishes Ôobject-knowledgeÕ from Ôknow-howÕ. 
14
 Jacobs thinks all truths have two elements, a truth-bearer and a truth-maker. A truth-bearer represents 
supposed metaphysical structure, whilst a truth-maker is the feature(s) of reality that make the truth bearer 
correct. Truths thus consist in the relationship between these two elements. Having established this position, 
Jacobs suggests that truth-bearers can be made true in more than one way. If a truth-bearer actually does Ôcarve 
reality at its jointsÕ it is a fundamental truth-bearer. If it proposes an artificial or gerrymandered structure on 
reality (if it is Ôontologically imperspicuousÕ) it is a non-fundamental truth-bearer. When we describe God in 
propositional terms, Jacobs concludes, all our descriptions are grounded in God (as an object), but they also all 
fall into the latter category. 
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strictly, literally true. And they can be importantly true. We can know them, and 
understand them. Some may be more fundamental than others, but God is 
ineffable because no matter what we say truly, we have failed to assert a perfectly 
fundamental truth. God is non-fundamentally effable, and fundamentally 
ineffable. (Jacobs, 2015: 167) 
Having said this much, might JacobÕs solution resolve our initial tension between divine ineffability 
and the beatific vision? Could this artificial or gerrymandered propositional knowledge of God be 
sufficient for the sort of knowledge wanted at the beatific vision? There is at least one good reason to 
think not. Recall that at the beatific vision the Apostle Paul taught that we will come to know God as 
God knows us. Whilst it might seem plausibly the case that we can only come to artificial or 
gerrymandered knowledge of God, it seems very strange indeed to say that GodÕs knowledge of us, 
His creation, is only artificial or gerrymandered, however these terms are to be understood. But if 
GodÕs knowledge of us captures fundamental truths about us, whilst our knowledge of God captures 
only non-fundamental truths about Him, we do not see how it could be the case that we would know 
God as God knows us.
15
 
That point aside, even if we can sensibly talk about God being (fundamentally) 
propositionally ineffable, there is another sort of ineffability, reserved for those who do not (or 
cannot) make themselves open to any sort of second-personal interaction. For want of a better 
expression, we will call this Ôpersonal ineffabilityÕ.
16
 Could God be personally ineffable? Simply put, 
to qualify for personal ineffability God would have to refrain from making himself open to any 
second-personal experience (or more strongly, that GodÕs creation would be necessarily incapable of 
second-personal experience of God). Furthermore, God would have to refrain from any revelation of 
Himself through narrative (or again more strongly, that it is impossible for God to reveal Himself 
																																								 																				
15
 One might quibble that we are putting too much weight on one verse, however we also feel the force of 
AquinasÕ argument here as well (see footnote 7). Could our desire to know the essence of God, our cause, be 
satisfied with only non-fundamental truths about him? We are not sure it would. 
16
 Note that we recognise this personal effability sounds quite strange, given that what is personally effable 
cannot be communicated propositionally, however we take it to be that what is personally effable can still be 
communicated, albeit communicated non-propositionally. 
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through narrative), for, Stump argues, Franciscan knowledge can be conveyed through narrative as it 
can through unmediated second-personal experience.
17
 
With respect to the divine, in both propositional and personal ineffability, ineffability 
involves propositional (or ÔDominicanÕ) ineffability.
18
 The difference between them is that in the case 
of propositional ineffability, what it is to be ineffable does not include ÔFranciscanÕ ineffability, whilst 
in the case of personal ineffability, it does. 
 
Limited divine ineffability 
So we have proposed two kinds of ineffability. Certainly, there is nothing logically preventing God 
from being both propositionally and personally ineffable. However, if God was indeed personally 
ineffable, it seems difficult to see how we could come to know God as God knows us (or at least, 
without suggesting that God does not know us very well), and so the doctrine of the beatific vision 
would remain in tension with the doctrine of divine ineffability.  
Preserving the doctrine of the beatific vision certainly seems like a good reason to favour 
propositional ineffability over personal ineffability, however is this reason alone sufficient to defend 
the idea that God is in fact personally effable? Perhaps, but it need not do all the work. To the doctrine 
of divine ineffability may be added the doctrine of divine revelation, that is, the doctrine that through 
creation, the incarnation
19
, and through scripture, God has in fact revealed something of Himself to 
humankind. If Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through second-personal experience and 
																																								 																				
17
 Stump makes clear to qualify in her recasting of the Mary thought experiment that it is for this reason, that is, 
that Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through narrative, it is essential all previous information Mary has 
of her mother is presented in non-narrative propositional form. 
18
 There is, of course, a third option: where something is effable in a Dominican sense but ineffable in a 
Franciscan sense (this might apply, for instance, in the case of an atom or quark), however it is difficult to see 
how propositional effability could ever sensibly cohere with the doctrine of divine ineffability, so we mention 
this only to leave it to one side. 
19
 See John 14:9, ÔJesus answered: ÒDon't you know me, Philip, even after I have been among you such a long 
time? Anyone who has seen me has seen the FatherÉÓÕ Note that if the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, it 
may be the case that all such revelation is Franciscan in character. In the case of the incarnation, one might have 
to concede that all pieces of seemingly Dominican knowledge we have of Christ pertain to his human and not 
his divine nature. What such a concession entails, or whether this concession even makes sense, is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
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narrative as Stump maintains, and if God has indeed revealed something, indeed anything, of Himself 
in a creation we can experience, through second-personal interaction in the incarnation, or through the 
narratives in scripture, it looks like God cannot be personally ineffable.
20
 The cost of defending 
personal ineffability is seemingly, therefore, that both the doctrine of the beatific vision and the 
doctrine of divine revelation are false Ð and this is, to our minds, a substantial enough cost to justify 
associating divine ineffability with mere propositional ineffability alone.
21
 
 
Reconciling divine ineffability with the beatific vision 
If we postulate that God is propositionally ineffable but personally effable, God remains both beyond 
(fundamental) description and beyond (fundamental) human concepts, in that knowledge of him can 
never be fully comprehended by or captured in (fundamental) descriptions or concepts, and in this 
way, the doctrine of divine ineffability can be upheld. Nevertheless, through some sort of intense 
second-personal experience at the beatific vision,
22
 God can still be personally known, fully and 
completely, just as we are taught in the doctrine of the beatific vision. To see how this might be the 
case, recall StumpÕs previously mentioned Mary thought experiment. When it comes to MaryÕs 
knowledge of her mother, both Franciscan and Dominican knowledge ally together. However, both 
kinds of knowledge are not simultaneously required for Mary to have some knowledge of her mother. 
We can see that this is the case as prior to meeting her, we take it that Mary had only Dominican 
knowledge of her mother. But MaryÕs knowledge need not be limited to Dominican/Franciscan or 
Dominican only. Nothing in this thought experiment requires that Mary has access every piece of 
Dominican knowledge about her mother. And, if the thought experiment still works (albeit without 
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 Adding to doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation, are the testimonies of those 
who claim to know God (even if the knowledge is presently ÔdimÕ). If divine ineffability entailed personal 
ineffability, such people could not, in fact, know God, and would therefore be mistaken in their claims.  
21
 We recognise that this isnÕt a particularly strong argument, however we canÕt see any other way around this. 
As we see it, given the seeming logical possibility of each, arbitration between these two positions comes down 
to which position incurs the greatest cost, where the cost is measured in terms of accepted doctrines one must 
sacrifice, and the route we are defending sees us sacrifice the fewest accepted doctrines. 
22
 See [removed for peer review] for one way in which to view the form such intense second-personal 
experience might take. Somewhat analogously, this second-person experience would be a more intense version 
of MaryÕs initial meeting with her mother in StumpÕs earlier described thought experiment. 
13	
	
some of its rhetorical force) if one of MaryÕs encyclopedias was missing a few pages, it can also work 
if we subtract from MaryÕs room all of MaryÕs encyclopedias. Mary now has no Dominican 
knowledge of her mother.
23
 If we substitute MaryÕs mother for a (fundamentally) propositionally 
ineffable God, and have this (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable God somehow reveal Himself 
to Mary, we might say that Mary now knows God, but her knowledge is purely Franciscan.
24
 And so, 
if this limited conception of divine ineffability is accepted, the doctrines of divine ineffability and of 
the beatific vision can be both simultaneously upheld and indeed therefore reconciled by the 
apophatic theologian. 
If what we have argued about how to interpret divine ineffability is correct, then even in the 
beatific vision God remains ineffable, in that, our full and complete knowledge of Him will not be 
able to be stated propositionally. But that is no great objection to the (merely propositional) view of 
divine ineffability we are proposing, since (i) it is part of the beauty of our richest and most intimate 
relationships that they go beyond what we can say in words, and (ii) just as God remains ineffable in 
the beatific vision, so do we, since even God cannot capture what it is to know us propositionally. 
Thus, on the view of ineffability we are proposing, persons are, in some sense, perhaps, essentially 
ineffable, both God and us.
25
 
 
																																								 																				
23
 Besides, perhaps, a vague inkling that her existence was probably caused by something. 
24
 Of course, Mary may have an inkling that God caused her to be, and so she might come to have some (non-
fundamental) propositional knowledge of God before the fact, but we could also imagine that she is completely 
ignorant of this fact. One does wonder what sort of experience she would have of God in this case, the sort of 
experience that left her (at least to begin with) with no propositional knowledge of God! But maybe all we need 
to assert is that Mary has no fundamental propositional knowledge of her mother, or of God. Perhaps this 
thought experiment retains its force if Mary merely possesses (or, in some second-personal interaction, comes to 
possess) some degree of non-fundamental propositional knowledge of her mother, or of God. 
25
 In defense of this claim, Stump herself concludes:   
 
There are, then, more things in heaven and earth than are captured by analytic philosophy. The 
knowledge of persons conveyed to us through our own second-person experiences and narratives about 
such experiences can, however, help us to apprehend them. There is a story told about Aquinas that 
seems to me just right here. Aquinas is the quintessential Dominican, in the literal as well as the 
typological sense, and he was one of the greatest philosophers and theologians in the Western tradition. 
But after a religious vision he quit writing. He said that, by comparison with what he had seen of God, 
the theories and arguments in his work were nothing but straw. This Dominican is contrasting 
(typologically understood) Dominican and Franciscan kinds of knowledge and decidedly privileging 
the Franciscan as regards the deity. (Stump, 2010: 61) 
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